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    • Russiaโ€™s Information War at Home: What Are These “Metodichki”?
    • Eurasian Economic Union: a Project to Fulfill the Needs of Russia or a Catalyst for Effective Integration?
    • Is the Russian Economy Really Suffering?
    • The Week of Russo-American Negotiations: Context, Hiccups, and Aftermath
    • 2022 Crisis in Kazakhstan
    • Geopolitical Weapon or Commercial Venture? Politics and Economics of Nord Stream 2
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    • Update: Georgia’s Parliament
    • Biden vs. Putin
    • The Ukrainian Border
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2022 Crisis in Kazakhstan

A sharp increase in domestic fuel prices in Kazakhstanโ€™s Mangystau region sparked widespread protests throughout the country. As of January 6, mass unrest in Kazakhstan spurred the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to send a โ€œpeacekeeping forceโ€ into the Central Asian country at the request of its embattled president.

The direct catalyst of the current protests in Kazakhstan was the formal end of subsidies for domestic prices of liquefied petroleum gas, or LPG. LPG is the most common fuel used for cars, particularly in the western regions, thus price controls kept it relatively affordable for the average Kazakhstani citizen. When subsidies were lifted on New Yearโ€™s Day, LPG prices doubled almost overnight. In Mangystau Oblast, an oil- and gas-rich region in Kazakhstanโ€™s southwest, the price rose from 60 tenge ($0.14) to 120 tenge ($0.28) per liter. According to the central authorities, the subsidies had pushed gas producers to export LPG abroad instead of selling domestically at a loss, which led to energy shortages at home. Nevertheless, broader socio-economic issues have caused tensions to fester under the surface in the tightly controlled, authoritarian country. The price hike acted more as a conduit, allowing pent up frustrations to boil over into open dissent.

The protests began in Mangystau on January 2, specifically in the oil town of Zhanaozen, later spreading to the regional capital of Aktau. Zhanaozen carries symbolic weight as it was the site where security forces opened fire at striking oil workers in 2011, killing around sixteen. Not long after demonstrations broke out during the first days of 2022, protests began to spread to other major cities such as Almaty and the capital Nur-Sultan, where they took on an increasingly political character. Complaints about price increases grew to include grievances over corruption, massive wealth disparities, and the lack of real political representation. Since gaining its independence in 1991, Kazakhstani politics has been dominated by its first president, Nursultan Nazarbaev, along with his close political, business, and familial allies. Despite stepping down from the presidency in 2019, Nazarbaev remained an influential figure. He handpicked current President Qasym-Jomart Toqaev as his successor, while many of his relatives held on to important posts in government and business. Nazarbaev himself had kept his position as head of the countryโ€™s Security Council and retained the title of Elbasy, or leader of the nation.

On January 4, President Toqaev initially struck a conciliatory tone with the protesters. On Twitter, he announced a price cap for LPG in Mangystau to be held at 50 tenge per liter. He also asked protesters to disregard the calls of โ€œdestructive figures interested in undermining the stability and unity of our society.โ€ On January 5, Toqaev sacked Prime Minister Askar Mamin and his ministerial cabinet. Reshuffling top ministries among a small pool of establishment elites is a common tool for the authorities to shift blame and responsibility during periods of turmoil. In February 2019, Nazarbaev also replaced his ministerial cabinet in response to protests regarding poor living conditions in the capital. However, Toqaevโ€™s concessions did little to slow down the current demonstrations. At some point on January 5, security forces lost control of the situation in Almaty as violent clashes broke out. Crowds began to storm and occupy several buildings in the city, including the Akimat (city administration building), the presidential residence, and Almaty International Airport. The government first declared states of emergency in Almaty, Mangystau Oblast, and Nur-Sultan. Later, a state of emergency was declared throughout the country.

During a televised address on January 5, Toqaev took a tougher stance against the unrest. โ€œNearly half of our countryโ€™s territory has been overtaken by disorder,โ€ the president said. Toqaev blamed the violence on โ€œhighly-organized hooligan elementsโ€ that demonstrate โ€œa carefully thought-out plan of action by financially-motivated conspirators.โ€ He also announced that he would replace Nazarbaev as head of the Security Council, stating that he intends โ€œto act as stringently as possible.โ€ Toqaev later spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenka to discuss the situation. By the end of the day, Toqaev formally requested CSTO assistance to โ€œovercome this terrorist threat.โ€ Following a brief CSTO meeting, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, as acting secretary of the organizationโ€™s Council of Collective Security, announced that a โ€œpeacekeeping forceโ€ will be deployed in Kazakhstan to โ€œstabilize and normalize the situation.โ€ Russia is expected to send the lionโ€™s share of the contingent, with Russian troops already arriving in the country.

In the early hours of January 6, amid a countrywide internet blackout, government troops reportedly conducted โ€œanti-terrorist operationsโ€ in Almaty. Information about the current situation remains murky and difficult to verify as the internet shut down has limited access to non-government sources. According to authorities in Almaty, 18 police officers died during the unrest and 2,000 people were arrested. The total number of deaths among civilians remains unknown. However, police spokeswoman Saltanat Azirbek stated that โ€œdozens of attackers were liquidated,โ€ the euphemism suggesting a grisly aftermath to the clashes in Almaty. Whether or not Toqaev can survive this unprecedented challenge to state authority in the short-term, the failure to address deep-seated social tensions could prolong Kazakhstanโ€™s current political crisis.

 

Prepared by Evaristo Luis Capalla, January 7, 2022.

—

Sources:

Auyezov, Olzhas. โ€œFresh violence in Kazakhstan after Russia sends troops to put down uprising.โ€ Reuters, January 6, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/troops-protesters-clash-almaty-main-square-kazakhstan-shots-heard-2022-01-06/.

Heintz, Jim. โ€œDozens of protesters, 12 police dead in Kazakhstan protests.โ€ Associated Press, Accessed January 6, 2022. https://apnews.com/article/business-kazakhstan-b263d10d8b982c521dd5188964036348.

โ€œKazakhstan: Demonstrators gain upper hand in increasingly turbulent unrest.โ€ Eurasianet, January 5, 2022. https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-demonstrators-gain-upper-hand-in-increasingly-turbulent-unrest.

Kumenov, Almaz and Joanna Lillis. โ€œKazakhstan explainer: Why did fuel prices spike, bringing protesters out onto the streets?โ€ Eurasianet, January 4, 2022. https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-explainer-why-did-fuel-prices-spike-bringing-protesters-out-onto-the-streets.

โ€œNazarbaev Fires Kazakh Government Over Low Living Standards, Economic Failures.โ€ RFE/RLโ€™s Kazakh Service, February 21, 2019. https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakh-government-resigns-nazarbaev/29783173.html.

โ€œะ’ ะšะฐะทะฐั…ัั‚ะฐะฝ ะฟั€ะธะฑั‹ะปะธ ะฟะตั€ะฒั‹ะต ะฟะพะดั€ะฐะทะดะตะปะตะฝะธั ั€ะพััะธะนัะบะธั… ะผะธั€ะพั‚ะฒะพั€ั†ะตะฒ.โ€ ะ ะ˜ะ ะะพะฒะพัั‚ะธ, January 6, 2022. https://ria.ru/20220106/mirotvortsy-1766771353.html.

โ€œะšะฐัั‹ะผ-ะ–ะพะผะฐั€ั‚ ะขะพะบะฐะตะฒ ะฟั€ะพะฒะตะป ะทะฐัะตะดะฐะฝะธะต ะกะพะฒะตั‚ะฐ ะ‘ะตะทะพะฟะฐัะฝะพัั‚ะธ.โ€ ะžั„ะธั†ะธะฐะปัŒะฝั‹ะน ัะฐะนั‚ ะŸั€ะตะทะธะดะตะฝั‚ะฐ ะ ะตัะฟัƒะฑะปะธะบะธ ะšะฐะทะฐั…ัั‚ะฐะฝ, January 6, 2022. https://akorda.kz/ru/kasym-zhomart-tokaev-provel-zasedanie-soveta-bezopasnosti-605452.

โ€œะ›ัƒะบะฐัˆะตะฝะบะพ ะฟั€ะพะฒะตะป ะฟะตั€ะตะณะพะฒะพั€ั‹ ั ะŸัƒั‚ะธะฝั‹ะผ ะธ ะขะพะบะฐะตะฒั‹ะผ ะพ ัะธั‚ัƒะฐั†ะธะธ ะฒ ะšะฐะทะฐั…ัั‚ะฐะฝะต.โ€ RBC News, January 5, 2022. https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/61d5c8689a794745379a5bfb.

ะขะพะบะฐะตะฒ, ะšะฐัั‹ะผ-ะ–ะพะผะฐั€ั‚. โ€œะžะฑั€ะฐั‰ะตะฝะธะต ะ“ะปะฐะฒั‹ ะณะพััƒะดะฐั€ัั‚ะฒะฐ ะšะฐัั‹ะผ-ะ–ะพะผะฐั€ั‚ะฐ ะขะพะบะฐะตะฒะฐ ะบ ะฝะฐั€ะพะดัƒ ะšะฐะทะฐั…ัั‚ะฐะฝะฐ.โ€ ะžั„ะธั†ะธะฐะปัŒะฝั‹ะน ัะฐะนั‚ ะŸั€ะตะทะธะดะตะฝั‚ะฐ ะ ะตัะฟัƒะฑะปะธะบะธ ะšะฐะทะฐั…ัั‚ะฐะฝ, January 5, 2022. https://www.akorda.kz/ru/obrashchenie-glavy-gosudarstva-kasym-zhomarta-tokaeva-k-narodu-kazahstana-503036.

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