Russia’s Information War at Home: What Are These “Metodichki”?

Shortly after Putin announced the start of “partial mobilization,” Russian state news agencies were sent “recommendations” from the presidential administration (PA) stating that people should receive the following message: “Russians must rally against the threat of NATO,” because it intends to “dismember and plunder” Russia (Meduza, 2022). In Russia, such “recommendations” are referred to as “metodichki” or manuals about the right way to talk about specific events. For the context of this study, the term “manuals” or “recommendations” will be used interchangeably to describe “metodichki” on how to talk about the war.

Overview of State Media Control Evolution in Russia

In Russia, the state often controls media content as a direct or associated mass media owner (Kiriya, 2021). In the early independence days, traditional media gained stability, and their development since has become relatively predictable. This led to the ideologization of the information space, which is manifested in the uncritical coverage of the actions of state bodies and institutions of power; the inconsistency of the artificially modeled information structure with the actual event field; and the quasi-patriotic presentation of information. Traditional media turned out to be unable to respond to a dynamic series of events quickly and energetically since the current structure of “newsbreaks” should be endorsed “at the top.”

All this did not correspond well to the ideas about modern, mobile, operational media that perform the function of an effective tool for broadcasting relevant information. As a response, in the early 2010s, the new information media related to the internet space entered the scene (Konradova, 2020). It was well used by opposition-minded segments of the population. With the anti-corruption protests in 2011 led by the prominent LiveJournal opposition blogger Alexey Navalny, and later with the eruption of Arab Spring in authoritarian states, where the mobilization was mainly successful thanks to the internet and messengers, Putin’s regime saw more danger from the internet than ever before (Greene & Robertson, 2019; Bruusgaard & Kerr, 2020). As a response to such waves of opposition, the government resorted to using the tools of legal control, in particular, the application of the provisions of Art. 282 Incitement of Hatred and Enmity, as well as Humiliation of Human Dignity (Droalin & Valleau, 2018).

A segment of the media space occupied by non-traditional media, which had powerful energy, relative freedom, interactive opportunities, and significant growth potential, lost all of its powers domestically after the war started. This set of characteristics brought even more abuse of the tools of legal control by the authorities in 2022: the blogger laws were followed by the foreign agent law by penalties for disseminating false information about the actions of the Russian military.

The Role of “Recommendations” in State Media Control

While we see more and more coercive tools used to spread domestic propaganda and minimize foreign propaganda in Russian media, some of the most effective tools are not necessarily coercive. The Kremlin today uses several ways to bring different “recommendations” to the controlled media and bloggers. This is done not on a case-by-case but on a regular basis – its fundamental difference from situational political PR. In today’s Russia, every week, the editors-in-chief of TV channels, the most prominent newspapers, and websites are instructed in person on the general guidelines and main lines of propaganda (Dovbysh & Mukhametov, 2020; Kovalev, 2021). In Russia, the refusal to work according to recommendations entails almost guaranteed problems for the media: a change in leadership or even the owner, financial complications (for example, the departure of advertisers who are somehow dependent on the state), blocking, and so on (Greene & Robertson, 2019).

Are These Recommendations Effective?

During opinion polls, the majority of Russians regularly join the very positions that are spelled out in the manuals–“we are not at war with Ukraine, but with NATO,” “Kherson region itself wanted to be part of Russia,” and the like (the Russian Public Opinion Research Center, cited in Meduza, 2022; the Public Opinion Fund, cited in Meduza, 2022; Radio Svoboda, 2022). This does not necessarily mean that citizens actually think so (telling a stranger who conducts a survey that you are against the war can be simply dangerous) – but at least they understand very well what kind of answers the state expects from them. This can also be considered a success of propaganda. People adjust their ideas about what is happening around them to those very manuals.

Where do Recommendations Come from?

Authoritarian and totalitarian states strive for an information monopoly, and media manuals are a way to use this monopoly. In Russia, manuals were invented in the PA to manage the information space. The distant “ancestors” of modern Russian recommendations can be considered monthly “briefings” for the chief editors of major media outlets, which, under Soviet rule, were held in the propaganda department of the Central Committee of the CPSU (Mitrohin, 2013). Each such event was devoted to one or two topics (it could be preparations for the next party congress and new clashes with “world imperialism,” for example, in Africa). A high-ranking official of the Central Committee apparatus, who “led” this topic and made a report, revealed (usually with figures and facts) that the position of the party and government – and the media had to pick it up, develop and interpret it for the public. There was no need to regularly send out texts defining topics of their coverage. The editors-in-chief usually came from the CPSU and understood the “general line” very well.

When it comes to the content of propaganda in the USSR, the greatest narrative for successful propaganda was presenting all antagonists as having a shared greater goal of starting a revolution in the USSR. Andropov (General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1982-1984), for example, used disinformation about the CIA’s ability to cause another revolution in the Soviet Bloc (Mitrohin, 2013). The CPSU had a counter-propaganda unit, which apparently (there is no direct evidence of this, and even informants from other sectors were not very willing to share information about it), was engaged in the selection of information that refutes the “Western” claims about the USSR, and its dissemination (Pechatnov, 2010). Sukhanov (1999), a Russian Soviet prose writer and journalist, judging by the transcripts of the “briefings” in the Central Committee of the CPSU for Soviet journalists, stated that such rebuttals of Western “slander” were a common phenomenon there. However, they were announced mainly by the deputy head of the department. Such propaganda was neither limited to newspapers nor the USSR population. In the 1956 recommendations for radio channels in the USSR, one area of radio propaganda highlighted how important was the “organization, support, and expansion of radio broadcasting to the socialist countries, Asia and Africa to form a favorable image of the USSR and carry out predominantly anti-American foreign policy propaganda” (Silina, 2009).

According to Pechatnov (2010), who studies CPSU’s foreign propaganda, the primary motivation for spreading such narratives was the failure to address foreign propaganda about the USSR’s Red Army’s brutalities during the war. In Molotov and Malenkov’s memorandum in 1945 (cited in Pechatnov, 2010), named “The Allied Campaign to Discredit the Red Army,” the passive response of the CPSU was the main topic of discussion, and the problem was asked to be addressed quickly. This position of the USSR’s authorities put the Union on the defensive and the West – the offensive.

From the CPSU to Modern Russia

One of the events that gave rise to such specific recommendations today is Russia’s war in Ukraine. In the context of the war in Ukraine, the new manuals target the US and NATO as responsible agents for the war. The primary purpose of such manuals is to hinder EU-Ukraine integration and justify the use of Russian military operations in Ukraine. The disinformation campaign that started in the USSR, which held that the West could start a revolution in the USSR, is continuing now, stating that the West achieved its goal and caused the war in Ukraine and wishes to get to Russia and its resources. The Kremlin today is taking the defensive position again, claiming that the West is responsible not only for the war or revolution itself but primarily for spreading false information and discrediting the Russian “special operation.” At the same time, Russian citizens who are vocal about their stance against the war are reported as “foreign agents” and sentenced for discrediting the Russian army. The success of Russian state propaganda, thus, in its relative consistency and perseverance in the domestic space.

Prepared by Darina Zhunussova, February 3, 2023.

References

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Meduza (March 7, 2022). Russia’s tricky opinion polling. https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/03/07/russia-s-tricky-opinion-polling 

Radio Svoboda (March 17, 2022). Nezavisimye sociologi: 71% rossijan ispytyvaet gordost’ iz-za vojny s Ukrainoj. https://www.svoboda.org/a/nezavisimye-sotsiologi-71-rossiyan-ispytyvaet-gordostj-iz-za-voyny-s-ukrainoy/31757535.html  

Meduza (October 8, 2022). «Ne razrushen, a vsego lish’ povrezhden». «Meduza» uznala, kak administracija prezidenta rekomenduet SMI pisat’ o vzryve na Krymskom mostu. https://meduza.io/news/2022/10/08/ne-razrushen-a-vsego-lish-povrezhden-meduza-uznala-kak-administratsiya-prezidenta-rekomenduet-gosudarstvennymi-smi-pisat-o-vzryve-na-krymskom-mostu?utm_source=email&utm_medium=signal&utm_campaign=2022-10-17 

Meduza (October 10, 2022). Eshhe odna metodichka, kotoruju nam udalos’ poluchit’ — o tom, kak rossijskie propagandisty dolzhny osveshhat’ podryv Krymskogo mosta «Isterija po povodu vzryva byla iskusstvennoj. Ushherb preuvelichen kievskoj propagandoj.» https://meduza.io/feature/2022/10/10/esche-odna-metodichka-kotoruyu-nam-udalos-poluchit-o-tom-kak-rossiyskie-propagandisty-dolzhny-osveschat-podryv-krymskogo-mosta?utm_source=email&utm_medium=signal&utm_campaign=2022-10-17